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Foreword 
This paper is one of the new series of Working Papers presenting the software for in- 
teractive decision support and software tools for developing decision support systems. 
These products constitute the outcome of the contracted study agreement between the 
System and Decision Sciences Program at IIASA and several Polish scientific institutions. 
The contracted study agreement is a continuation of the previous scientific collaboration 
which is documented in the IIASA Working Paper WP-88-071 entitled Theory, Software 
and Testing Ezamples in Decision Support Systems. 
This paper presents the MCBARG methodology and software, which is designed to 
support analysis of conflicting decision situations and mediations in multicriteria bar- 
gaining problem. The implemented approach utilizes the aspiration-led paradigm and 
concepts of interactive solutions in multicriteria bargaining. The enhanced version of 
the MCBARG presented here provides also an example which illustrates posibjlities of 
application of MCBARG to a research being performed at IIASA. The software package 
described in this paper is available from the System and Decision Sciences Program. 
Alexander B. Kurzhanski 
Chairman 
System and Decision Sciences Program. 

Abstract 
The MCBARG is a decision support system designed to help in the analysis of deci- 
sion situations and in the mediation in multicriteria bargaining problems. It supports 
reaching the final outcome in the problem. The report describes an enhanced version 
of the MCBARG system. It provides the user with a theoretical foundation and with 
information necessary to use the system. 
The system and the theoretical research have been done under a contracted study 
agreement with the Systems and Decision Sciences Program of the International Institute 
for Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenburg, Austria, and with financial support of the 
Research Program CPBP 02.15 of the Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of 
Sciences, Warsaw, Poland. 
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MCBARG - Enhanced 
A System Supporting Multicriteria 
Bargaining 
Lech Krui, Piotr Bronisz, Boiena Lopuch * 
1 Introduction 
This paper deals with decision problems in multiactors game-like-situations in which the 
decision makers (individuals, firms, nations - "players") have conflicting interests and their 
final outcomes are determined within interactive bargaining. There are many complex sit- 
uations in this class of problems in which the decision makers need help to learn about 
possible decision options and decision consequences. The MCBARG system enables learn- 
ing process of the players, and supports reaching the final outcome in the multicriteria 
bargaining problem. It is based on some new theoretical results on interactive mediation 
processes with an application of aspiration-led methodology of decision support system. 
The multicriteria bargaining problem is a generalization of classical bargaining prob- 
lem, under the assumption that there are not given explicitly the utility functions of 
players. This generalization follows from the fact that an aggregation of players' objec- 
tives is often impossible because of various practical limitations of the utility theory. The 
problem is defined by an agreement set - the set of outcomes that can be reached under 
unanimous agreement of the players, and by a disagreement (status quo) point which is 
a result of the problem if there is no such an agreement. 
The interactive mediation process is described by a procedure which consists in gen- 
eration of a sequence of outcomes leading to a nondominated solution. The procedure is 
based on a limited confidence principle, taken from practical observation, which says that 
the players have limited confidence in their ability to predict consequences and possible 
outcomes, hence each player tries to prevent other players from receiving disproportion- 
ally large gains. The generated outcomes are consistent with preferences of the players. 
The procedure assures some fairness rules and is resistant to the various manipulations 
of the players. 
The MCBARG system includes a generator and an editor of the model of the bargain- 
ing problem for which the interactive procedure is performed. The model describes the 
agreement set in form of a set of inequalities, and the status quo point. The generator 
and the editor enable introducing linear or nonlinear formulae defining the inequalities 
using standard arithmetic operators and some common functions. 
This latest version of the MCBARG system includes the following extensions in com- 
parison to the older version described by Bronisz P., L. Krus, B. Lopuch (1988): 
- A new user interface of the system has been elaborated including a new system of 
menus, new options, and new graphical presentation of results, which makes, as it seems, 
the system more user-friendly. 
'Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences, Newelska 6 ,  01-447 Warsaw, Poland. 
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- In this version, explicit division of roles of the system analyst (named in the system 
"OPERATOR") and of the players has been introduced. It is assumed, that at first the 
bargaining problem is prepared by the system analyst, next, the system analyst begins 
and conducts the negotiation procedure in which human players participate. 
- The players have limited access to the counterplayers information. The information 
is protected by passwords. 
- The players can simulate and analyze the counterplayers decisions and their impact 
on the obtained outcomes. In the older version, the counterplayers decisions during the 
unilateral analysis were assumed by default values of the system. 
- A new option OLD SESSION has been introduced. The system enables a user to 
save a performed session on a disk. The saved session can be analyzed, and if needed, can 
be used to restart the negotiation procedure. 
- The editor of the model and the solver procedures have been modified. In the model 
of the bargaining problem minimized and maximized criteria can be explicitly formulated. 
In the older version all criteria were assumed to be maximized. New routines for checking 
formal correctness of the model and proper formulation of the bargaining problem have 
been included. 
- A new illustrative example referring to an international cooperation on the acid 
rains problem has been elaborated and used as a tutorial in the paper. 
This report is organized as follows. Section 2 contains mathematical formulation of the 
multicriteria bargaining problem and methodological background of solution concept and 
of interactive algorithm. Section 3 explains the use of the system, i.e. how to create model 
of a bargaining game and how to support mediation. Section 4 presents an illustrative 
example of a bargaining game played with the system support. Section 5 contains technical 
information. 
Section 2 is a revised version of the theoretical foundations presented in the description 
of the previous version of the MCBARG system. Sections 3, 4 and 5 have been completely 
rewritten to cover the new version of the MCBARG system. 
2 Theoretical foundations 
2.1 Introduction 
In most approaches (see Nash, 1950, Raiffa, 1953, Kalai and Smorodinsky, 1975, Roth, 
1979), the bargaining problem has been considered in the case of unicriterial payoffs of 
players, i.e. when the preferences of particular players are expressed by utility functions. 
In many practical applications however, players trying to balance a number of objectives 
might have difficulties while constructing such utility functions. Moreover, the classic 
literature considers mostly axiomatic models of bargaining which yield one-shot solutions 
and do not result in procedures describing a process of reaching a binding agreement. 
We consider n players, each with several objectives, so we deal with a multiobjective 
bargaining problem. In this problem, the players are faced with an agreement set of 
feasible outcomes. Any such outcome can be accepted as the result if it is specified by an 
unanimous agreement of all players. In the event that no unanimous agreement is reached, 
the status quo point is the result. If there are feasible outcomes which all participants 
prefer to the status quo point, then there is an incentive to reach an agreement. In most 
situations, players differ in their opinions about which outcome is most preferable, hence 
there is a need for bargaining and negotiation. 
When dealing with multiple payoffs, we do not assume that there exist explicitly given 
utility functions of the players. In this case the solution can be found in an interactive 
procedure. Such a procedure is considered here. The procedure starts from the status 
quo point and leads to a nondominated, individually rational solution belonging to the 
agreement set. During the interaction, players can express their preferences and can 
influence the course of the iterative process. 
2.2 Problem formulation and definitions 
Let N = {1,2,. . . , n} be the finite set of players, each player having m; objectives. A 
multiobjective bargaining problem is defined as a pair (S, d), where an agreement set S 
is a subset of C:=, m; - dimensional Euclidean space, called RNM, and a disagreement 
point (status quo point) d belongs to S. 
The bargaining problem has the following interpretation: every point x E RNM, 
x = (xl,  x2,. . . , x,), x; = ( x ; ~ ,  x;2,. . . , x;,~), in the agreement set S represents payoffs for 
all the players that can be reached when they do cooperate with each other (xij denotes 
the payoff of the j-th objective for the i-th player). If the players do not cooperate, the 
disagreement point is the result. 
Each objective can be maximized or minimized. For simplicity of problem formulation 
in Section 2 we assume that all objectives are maximized. 
We employ a convention that for x, y E Rk, x > y implies x; > y; for i = 1 , .  . . , k, 
x > y implies x > y, x # y, x >> y implies x; > y; for i = 1,. . . , k. We say that x E Rk 
is a weak Pareto optimal point in X if x E X and there is no y E X such that y >> x; 
x E X is a strict Pareto optimal point in X if there is no y E X such that y > x. 
We confine our consideration to the class of all multicriteria bargaining games (S, d) 
satisfying the following conditions: 
(i) S is compact and there is x E S such that x > d, 
(ii) S is comprehensive, i.e. for x E S if d 5 y 5 x then y E S. 
(iii) For any x E S, let Q(S,x) = { i  : y 2 x, y; > x; for some y E S}. Then for any 
x E S, there exists y E S such that y 2 x, y; > x; for each i E Q(S, x). 
Condition (i) states that the set S is closed, upper bounded and the problem is not 
degenerated. Condition (ii) says that objectives are disposable, i.e. that if the players 
can reach the outcome x then they can reach any outcome worse than x. Q(S,x)  is the 
set of all coordinates in RNM, payoffs of whose members can be increased from x in S. 
Condition (iii) states that the set of Pareto optimal points in S contains no "holes". We 
do not assume convexity of S, however, any convex set satisfies condition (iii). 
The problem consists in supporting the players in reaching a nondominated solution, 
agreeable and close to their preferences. 
Definitions: 
A point xi E S is defined as i-nondominated, i E N ,  if there is no y E S such that 
y; > xi. A point u E RNM is defined as a utopia point relative to aspirations (RA utopia 
point) if for each player i E N ,  there is an i-nondominated point x' E S such that u; = xi. 
The i-nondominated point is an outcome which could be achieved by a rational player i 
if he would have full control of the moves of the other players. Let us observe that if in 
the unicriterial set there is only one i-nondominated point, then in the multicriteria case 
considered here there is a set of such points. Each player i ,  i E N ,  is required then to 
investigate the set of i-nondominated points in S as m;-dimensional multicriteria decision 
problem and then to select one i-nondominated point as his most preferable outcome. 
The RA utopia point generated by the selected i-nondominated points, i E N,  carries 
information about the most preferable outcomes for all the players. The RA utopia point 
significantly differs from the ideal (utopia) point defined by the maximal values of all 
objectives in set S .  
2.3 Interactive procedure 
We are interested in a constructive procedure that is acceptable to all the players, starts 
at the status quo point and leads to a strict Pareto optimal point in S. The procedure 
can be described as a sequence, {di},k=,, of agreement points df such that dO = d, dt E S, 
di > #-I, for t = 1,2, .  . . , dk is a strict Pareto optimal point in S. (The assumption 
di > di-' follows from the fact that no player will accept improvement of payoffs for 
other players at the cost of his concession.) At every round t,  each player i E N specifies 
his preferable reference point rf E Rmt, rf > df defining his improvement direction 
Xf E Rml, Xf = rf  - d f ,  and proposes his confidence coefficient of E R, 0 < of 5 1. 
The improvement direction Xf  indicates the i-th players preferences over his objectives at 
round t. The confidence coefficient of reflects his ability at round t to describe preferences 
and to predict precisely all consequences and possible outcomes in S. (For more detailed 
justification, see Fandel, Wierzbicki, 1985, and Bronisz, Krus, Wierzbicki, 1988). 
We propose an interactive negotiation process defined by a procedure: 
{dt IS"=, such that dO = d, (*> 
dt = dt-' + E' * [u(S, dt-', A t )  - dt-'1 for t = 1,2, .  . . , 
where 
A t  E RNM, A t  = ( X i ,  Xi, . . . , A h ) ,  is the improvement direction specified jointly by all 
the players, 
u(S, dt-', A t  ) E RNM is the utopia point relative to the direction A t  at round t defined 
by 
u(S, dt-', A t )  = (ul(S, dt-', X i ) ,  u2(S, dt-', Xi), . . . , un(S, dt-', A h ) ) ,  
u;(S, 8-', X f )  = max, {xi E Rmi : x E S, z > dt-', x, = 4-' + aXf for some a E R }, 
- 
-
t t ct = min (a:, a:, . . . , on, omax) E R, where aka, is the maximal number o such that 
8 - I  + o [ u ( ~ ,  6 - I ,  A t )  - 8-l] belongs to S. 
The utopia point u(S, &-I, A t )  relative to the aspirations of the players (relative to 
direction A t )  reflects the preferences of the particular players when the improvement di- 
rection At  is specified at round t. The individual outcome u;(S, dt-', X f )  is the maximal 
payoff in S for the i-th player from dt-' according to the improvement direction X f ,  while 
ct is the minimal confidence coefficient of the players at round t (we assume that no 
player can agree on a coefficient greater than his) such that a new calculated agreement 
point belongs to S. The preferable direction Xf at round t is specified on the basis of 
interactive scanning of a number of solutions generated for assumed by players different 
reference points. The proposed approach is very close to the achievement function concept 
(Wierzbicki, 1982) from the point of view of the user. Analogously, a special way of the 
parametric scalarization of the multiobjective problem is utilized to be an influence on 
the selection of solutions by changing reference points. To solve the problem, directional 
maximization is applied, using a bisection method. (see Bronisz and Krus, 1988). The 
scanning (called in the system the improvement directions testing) is performed inde- 
pendently by each of players. Given the information about the current status quo and 
ideal point the player proposes a number of reference points and confidence coefficient. 
For each reference point rf > df and confidence coefficient af given by the player at the 
round t,  the system calculates: 
u,(S,d'-', A:) = max, - {xi E Rmi : x E S, x  2 d f - ' ,  x; = 4-' + aA: for some a  E R ) ,  
one-shot solution: 
t x = max, { x  E S : x  = 2-' + a  * [u(S, 2-' , A t )  - 2-'1 for some a  E R ), 
- 
anticipated solution: 
,t = 2-' + &t * [u(S, 2-', A t )  - df-'1 
maximal confidence coefficient: 
t a,,, = max, { a  E R :  8-' + a *  [u(S,b-',At) - 2-'1 E S for some a  E R}, 
- 
where At E R * ~ ,  At = ( A ,  A , . . . ,  A ) ,  A = A for j # i Af = rt 1 - dl o 
u(S, &-I, At) E RNM is the utopia point relative to the direction At .  
Having the above information for a number of reference points, the player then selects 
his prefered one. It defines the improvement direction of this player. Defined in this way, 
improvement directions of all the players Af are used for the calculation of the result dt of 
the negotiation round. 
The procedure is based on the following theoretical result (see: Bronisz, Krus, Lopuch, 
1987, and Bronisz, Krus, Wierzbicki, 1988): 
Theorem 1. For any multicriteria bargaining game (S, d) satisfying conditions (i), 
(ii) and (iii) and for any confidence coefficients af such that 
there is a unique process dt, t = O,1,. . . , T ,  T 5 oo, described by (*) satisfying the 
following postulates: 
P1. @ = d ,  8 E S f o r t  = 1,2  ,..., T ,  
P2. 8 > 8-' for t = 1,2, .  . . , T ,  
P3. dT ( = lim*,, 8 if T = oo ) is a strict Pareto optimal point in S. 
P4. Principle of a-limited confidence. Let 0 < crf I 1 be a given confidence coefficient 
of the i-th player at round t. Then acceptable demands are limited by: 
d' - d'-' 5 aL,[u(d'-') - &-'I for t = 1 , .  . . , T, 
where aL, is a joint confidence coefficient at round t, aLn = min {cr:, . . . , a:), 
u(dt-') is the RA-utopia point which reflects the preferences of the players in the 
subset of the set S given by { x  E S : x  > dt-' ) 
P5. Principle of recursive rationality. Given dt, at each round t ,  there is no such 
outcome x E S, x > 8, that x satisfies P4 (x substitutes dt in P4). 
P6. Principle of proportional gains. For each round t,  t = 1, .  . . , T, there is a number 
p > 0 such that 
s - s-' = p[u(&-') - &-'I. 
The presented approach has been examined in a case of one-round process with con- 
fidence coefficients of the players equal to one. The corresponding one-shot solution has 
been characterized axiomatically (Bronisz and Krus, 1987a). It is easy to notice that in 
the unicriterial case, each game (S, d) has a unique utopia point which coincides with the 
ideal point and the one-shot solution coincides with the Raiffa solution (see Raiffa, 1953, 
Roth, 1979). 
It is assumed that after testing of right amount of reference points each player se- 
lects his preferable direction. However, it may happend that a player has not sufficiently 
tested his set of nondominated points and selects a weak Pareto outcome as his preferable 
result. In such a case, even if all the players assume the confidence coefficients greater 
than the values of maximal confidence coefficients, the procedure should proceed in sev- 
eral iterations more, until1 it reaches a strict Pareto solution in S .  In the system this 
inconvenience is removed by the application of an option of lexicographical improvement 
of a weak Pareto solution to a strict Pareto one without interaction of the players. The 
option is used only in the case that all the players assume their confidence coefficients 
greater than the values of maximal confidence coefficients. In such a case it is assumed 
that they are going to finish the interactive process. The lexicographical improvement 
proceeds in the following way: 
Let us assume that in round t the obtained agreement point 
is a weak Pareto optimal. For a finite subsets of integer numbers I ,  J ,  let 
e ( I ,  J) = (el(I ,  J),.  . . ,e ,(I ,  J)) E  RNM 
be such that ej j(I ,  J) = At for i E I and j E J, otherwise ej j(I ,  J) = 0. 
Given y E S with Q(S, y) # 0, define x(S, y )  E S by 
x ( S , y ) = r n a x , { x ~ S : x = y + a * e ( Q ( S , y ) )  - forsome a €  R) .  
Intuitively, the vector e(Q(S, y)) includes all the coordinates of vector A t ,  and along with 
the solution may be improved. Otherwise, the corresponding coordinate of the vector 
e(Q(S,y)) is equal to 0. Then the lexicographical improvement can be defined by the 
sequence {xj);0=, such that x0 = 8, and x j  = x(S, xj-') for j = 1,2 , .  . . . It is shown 
(Bronisz and Krus, 1988) that there is exactly one such sequence, moreover this sequence 
is finite. 
The presented lexicographical improvement has been examined in a case of one-round 
process, i.e. when a weak Pareto optimal solution is reached in the first round. It is shown 
(Bronisz and Krus, 1988) that in such a case the solution of the bargaining process can be 
described with the Rawlsian lexmin principle (Rawls, 1971). Moreover, in the unicriterial 
case, the solution coincides with the Imai solution (Imai, 1983). 
User guide 
3.1 General information 
The MCBARG system is a decision support system designed to help in analysis of a deci- 
sion situation and mediation in multicriteria bargaining problem in which a mathematical 
model of the problem can be formulated by a status-quo point and a system of inequalities 
describing agreement set in objective space of the players. 
The program is recorded on one diskette that can be installed on an IBM-PC-XT, 
AT or compatible computer with Hercules Graphics Card, Color Graphic Adapter (CGA) 
or Enhanced Graphics Adapter (EGA). A diskette contains compiled code of the program 
together with some data files for a demonstrative example of the bargaining problem. 
The system supports the following general functions: 
1. The definition and edition of a model of the bargaining problem. 
2. The analysis of the bargaining problem and performing interactive negotiation- 
mediation procedure. 
The model definition and edition should be done by a system analyst called further in 
the system an OPERATOR. The OPERATOR prepares and conducts the interactive negotiation 
procedure. He gives a control to players during performing negotiation-mediation session. 
He takes control over the system again after the session is interrupted or finished. 
The interactive procedure is performed by human players. It proceeds in a number of 
iterations (rounds) and in each iteration the system supports the players in: 
Initial multiobjective analysis of the bargaining problem resulting in an estimation of 
bounds on efficient outcomes and learning about the extreme and neutral outcomes. 
Unilateral, interactive analysis of the problem with stress on learning, organized 
through system response to user specified confidence coefficients and aspiration levels 
for objective outcomes. 
a Calculation of the multilateral, cooperative solutions according to player preferences. 
The system is operated with the use of a set of menus. Particular options can be 
selected by the option first letter or by cursor and <Enter> key. 
The system is self-explaining, it includes a set of information facilitating working with 
the system. 
All of the screens include a highlighted head bar which displays the current phase of 
the system where the user is, and a bottom help bar displaying operating keys. 
In the following subsections more detailed information about particular options of the 
system menus is presented. 
3.2 Main Menu 
INFORMATION option 
The INFORMATION option presents general information about the system. 
MODEL option 
The MODEL option enables definition and edition of a model of bargaining problem. The 
bargaining problem is described by a set of players having several criteria, by an agreement 
set and by a status quo point. 
The following options of MODEL menu allow: 
INFORMATI ON- present the information about the actual phase of work, 
LOAD - load an existing model or give a name to a new one, 
EDIT - edit an existing model or create a new one, 
BUILD - translate the loaded model into an internal form and perform initial calcula- 
tions, 
QUIT - exit to MAIN menu. 
The LOAD option enables the selection of a model from displayed model names or the 
insertion of a new model name (each model is stored in a file having the model name and 
the default extention .MOD). Short information about the highlighted model including its 
name, number of players, their names and numbers of criteria is given in the window on 
the right side of the screen. 
The EDIT option enables edition or creation of a model. The built-in editor is especially 
designed for this purpose. This option invokes the EDIT MODEL menu described in the 
following section. 
To utilize the model in the NEGOTIATION option of the MAIN menu first it has to be 
translated into an internal form. This is done by the BUILD option. The system performs 
the needed initial calculations and checks the correctness of the model of bargaining 
problem. In particular, it is checked whether the agreement set is bounded, and the 
status quo point belongs to  the agreement set. 
OLD SESSION option 
The option makes it possible load and view an old session. It is useful for analysis as well 
as for restarting from the previously performed and saved session. Options displayed at 
OLD SESSION menu enable to: 
INFORMATION- present the information about the actual phase of work, 
LOAD - load an old session, 
VIEW - view the session results, 
PRINT - print the session report, 
qUIT - exit to MAIN menu. 
The LOAD option enables the selection of a session from displayed session names (each 
session is stored in a file having the session name and the default extension . SES). Short 
information about the highlighted session including: model and session name, number of 
players, their names and numbers of criteria, is given in the window on the right side of 
the screen. 
The VIEW option supports reviewing the results obtained in succeeding iterations of the 
session selected with the use of the LOAD option. The following information are presented 
on the screen: 
- player name, 
- number of reviewed iteration, 
- status of the session (finished or not), 
- confidence coefficients: joint and assumed by the player 
next in the upper table: 
- status quo, 
- agreement outcomes in the previous iteration, 
- agreement outcomes in the given iteration, 
- one-shot solution, 
- ideal point 
and in the lower table 
- graphical presentation of results. The bars represent improvements obtained at  the 
agreement solution in comparison to the status quo (scaled by the distance between 
the status quo and the ideal point), starting from the left side of the window for 
the criteria to be maximized, and from the right side - for the minimized ones. The 
highlighted part of the bar represents the improvement obtained in comparison to 
the previous iteration result. 
The OPERATOR can use following set of keys: 
<left, right arrow> - scroll the reviewed iterations, 
<Ctrl PgUp, Ctrl PgDn> - set active criterion (to be scrolling), 
<PgUp, PgDn> - scroll the criteria, 
<Ctrl P >  - scroll the players. 
The PRINT option makes it possible to print a report of the current session in aggre- 
gated or in detailed form. In the aggregated report only the status quo, the ideal point 
and the agreement points at  succeeding iterations are presented. In the detailed report 
all the data presented at  VIEW option are printed. 
NEGOTIATION option 
The NEGOTIATION option activates the negotiation-mediation procedure. This version of 
the system is built for one computer, therefore the players can enter into the system in 
a sequence, once at  each iteration. In the case where one of the players interrupts the 
procedure or the session is finished, the control should be given to the OPERATOR. 
The information devoted to a particular player is protected with the use of a password. 
The password is fixed during the first entry of the player or the OPERATOR. Before the 
session, the players should agree upon a level of availability of their information to the 
counterplayers. There are three possibilities in the system, called access levels: 
LEVEL 0 - no access to information about counterplayers criteria nor results, 
LEVEL 1 - access to information about counterplayers criteria and past results, pos- 
sible simulation of the counterplayers decisions and observation of their 
effect on the player results, 
LEVEL 2 
- access to information about counterplayers criteria and past results, pos- 
sible simulation of the counterplayers decisions, and observation of their 
effect on the player and the counterplayers results. 
The agreed player access level, to be enforced in the session, is entered by the OPERATOR 
at the beginning of the session. 
Any player or OPERATOR enters the system by selection of his name. The player takes 
control over the system with use of the NEGOTIATION menu, while the OPERATOR with use 
of the OPERATOR menu. 
3.3 Edit Model Menu 
To create a new model the following values must be entered with use of the EDIT MODEL 
menu : 
number of players and their names (PLAYERS option). 
Minimum: 2 players. Maximum: 5 players. 
number of criteria of each player (CRITERIA option). 
Minimum: 1 criterion. Maximum: 8 criteria. 
description of criteria (<F2> key in CRITERIA option). 
criteria units (<F3> key in CRITERIA option). 
status of the criteria - min for minimized and max for maximized (<F4> key in 
CRITERIA option). 
status quo value for each criterion (<F3> key in CRITERIA option). 
Default: 0.0. 
set of formulae describing the agreement set (FORMULAE option). 
The players are recognized by their names. To facilitate a description of criteria names 
in formulae, the criterion of the given player has the following alphanumeric code: "In", 
where 1 means letter of the given player (a or A - first player, b or B - second player, 
and so on), n denotes number of the criterion. (For example, "c2" means variable for the 
second criterion of the third player). 
The set of formulae describing an agreement set should be in the form: 
which gives the following set of inequalities: 
express ion1 >= 0 for I = 1 ,2 , .  . . , N .  
A formulanamel ,  I = 1, ..., N, should begin with a letter. It can be treated as a 
comment to an e x p r e s s i o n l .  An exp re s s ion l ,  I = 1, . . . , N, is Pascal-language-like 
expression, which can include: 
constants - in normal or in exponential form; 
variables for criteria - as presented in the above alphanumeric code " In"; 
operators divided into 4 categories, listed by their order of precedence: 
I )  Exponentiation: - , 
2) Unary minus: - , 
3) Multiplying operators: *, / , 
4) Adding operators: +, - ; 
parentheses: (, ) ; 
arithmetic functions: s i n ,  cos, exp, log. 
s i n  - returns the sine of the argument (the argument is expressed in radians), 
cos - returns the cosine of the argument (the argument is expresses in radians), 
exp - returns the exponential of the argument, 
l o g  - returns the natural logarithm of the argument. 
The argument of each function should be written in parentheses. 
EXAMPLE of a formula for two players, each one having two criteria: 
formula = 1000 - a1  - exp(a2+bl) - ( b2 - 1.05e-2 ) - 2  ; 
An edited model is stored in the memory, if you want to use the same model in the 
future you should write it on the disk when leaving the EDIT MODEL option. 
The BUILD option preforms the same actions as the BUILD option in the MODEL menu 
(translates the model into an internal form and performs needed initial calculations). It 
is included into this menu for user convenience. 
3.4 Negotiation Menu 
Each player enters the system by selection of his name and typing the password. The 
following options of NEGOTIATION menu allow him to: 
INFORMATION - present the information about the actual phase of work, 
DECISION - test and make decision in the given iteration, 
VIEW - view obtained results, 
PRINT - print the current session report, 
QUIT - exit to the NEGOTIATION option. 
DECISION option 
The DECISION option enables testing different improvement directions starting from the 
last agreement point (in the first iteration it is a status quo point). It allows for an 
interactive scanning of variants of outcomes. The variants are generated by the player 
for specified reference points. The points correspond to the improvement directions. The 
resulting outcomes are calculated for the player at the assumed confidence coefficient and 
at the assumed improvement directions of the other players. By the scanning the player 
can test his preferences and select his preferable outcome and corresponding reference 
point. 
The following options of the DECISION menu allow the player: 
CONF-COEF - specification of confidence coefficient, 
NEWREF - specification of reference point and creation of a new variant, 
VIEW-CNTRSL - displaying results for simulated counterplayers actions (accessible for the 
LEVEL 1 and the LEVEL 2 only), 
SELECT - selection of the preferable variant, 
QUIT - exit to the DECISION menu. 
The keys presented in bottom help lines enable: 
scrolling the variants (<Tab> and <Up, Dn arrows>), 
scrolling the criteria (<Ctrl PgUp>, <Ctrl PgDn>, <PgUp>, <PgDn>), 
displaying the anticipated solution in the graphical form (<Ctrl G > ) .  
Using these options the player can create and compare a number of outcome variants. 
The system presents: 
- status quo, 
- cooperative solution obtained at the previous iteration (Prev. sol.), 
- ideal point. 
These values define a range of possible outcomes and reasonable reference points. 
The created variants are stored on the disk. The first variant is created by the system, 
under the assumption that the improvement direction is defined according to the ideal 
point, and serves the player introductory information. The solution presented at this 
variant is called the neutral solution. 
For each variant the system calculates and presents: 
- anticipated outcomes (Ant. sol.), 
- utopia points relative to aspirations of the player (RA-utopia point). 
The RA-utopia point denotes the outcomes the player could obtain under the as- 
sumption that the other players get no improvement at this iteration. The aniticipated 
outcomes are calculated for the assumed actions of the counterplayers. By system default, 
these actions are based on the variants selected by the counterplayers at the previous it- 
eration (in the 1-st iteration the ideal point is taken). 
The CONF-COEF and NEWBEF options can be used for generation of a new variant. The 
CONF-COEF option makes it possible to specify to the player the assumed value of this 
iteration confidence coefficient (within the range (0, 11). The NEWBEF option enables one 
to enter the references for the player's objectives for which the outcome will be calculated. 
In the case of LEVEL 0 the values for the counterplayers references are specified by the 
system. In the case of LEVEL 1 and LEVEL 2, the player can accept the default values for 
the counterplayer references or specify them himself. 
Comparison of outcomes from different assumed actions of counterplayers is possible 
with use of the VIEW-CNTRPL option. This option can be activated only for the access 
LEVEL 1 and LEVEL 2. Selecting this option the player obtains information on his one- 
shot outcomes (in the case of LEVEL 1 access) and on one-shot outcomes of counterplayers 
(in case of the LEVEL 2 access). The one-shot solution denotes outcomes the player could 
obtain under the assumption of the full confidence (i.e. confidence coefficient equal to 
one). The information is presented in two tables - the table on the left side of the screen 
relates to the particular counterplayer, the table on the right side - to the active player. 
Scrolling the counterplayers can be done with use of <Ctrl P> keys, toggling the left and 
right tables with use of <left and right arrow> keys, scrolling variants and criteria - as 
mentioned above. 
After making some tests for different improvement directions, the player should specify 
the preferable variant. The SELECT option is used for this purpose. This variant will be the 
base for the agreement point calculation. The agreement solution at the given iteration 
is calculated when all the players have made their decisions. Then the system starts the 
next iteration. 
VIEW option 
The VIEW option supports reviewing the results obtained in the previous iterations. The 
following information is presented on the screen: 
- player or the counterplayer name to which the information refers, 
- number of reviewed iterations, 
- status of the session (finished or not), 
- confidence coefficients: joint and assumed by the operating player, 
below of this in the upper table: 
- status quo, 
- agreement outcomes in the previous iteration, 
- agreement outcomes in the given iteration, 
- one-shot solution, 
- ideal point 
and in the lower table 
- graphical presentation of results. 
The bars represent improvements obtained at  the agreement solution in comparison 
to the status quo (scaled by the distance between the status quo and the ideal point), 
starting from the left side of the window for the criteria to be maximized, and from 
the right side - for the minimized ones. The highlighted part of the bar represent the 
improvement obtained in comparison to the previous iteration result. 
The player can use the following set of keys: 
<left, right arrow> - scroll the reviewed iterations, 
<Ctrl PgUp, Ctrl PgDn> - set active criterion (to be scrolling), 
<PgUp, PgDn> - scroll the criteria, 
<Ctrl C> - view the counterplayers ( <Ctrl P> - scroll the counterplayers, <Ctrl 
Y >  - return to the operating player). 
The information about the counterplayers is presented only if the access LEVEL 1 or 
LEVEL 2 has been chosen. 
PRINT option 
The PRINT option makes it possible to print a report of the current session in aggregated 
or in detailed form. In the aggregated report only the status quo point, the ideal point 
and the agreement points at succeeding iterations are presented. In the detailed report all 
the data presented at VIEW option are printed. Results of the counterplayers are printed 
in the case of the LEVEL 1 and LEVEL 2 accesses. 
QUIT option 
Warning! 
The player should not leave the NEGOTIATION menu before making a decision defining 
the preferable improvement direction. It is done by selecting the preferable variant with 
the use of the SELECT option of the DECISION menu. Otherwise, the system assumes that 
the player interrupts the session. 
3.5 Operator Menu 
The OPERATOR can take control over the system during the negotiation procedure at each 
iteration. He should take the control if the session has been interrupted or finished. The 
OPERATOR menu includes the following options which allows him to: 
VIEW - view the players results, 
PRINT - print the session report, 
CONTINUE - continue the session, 
QUIT - exit to MAIN menu. 
The description of the VIEW and PRINT options is analogical as in the case of OLD 
SESSION menu. The OPERATOR has full access to the information, disregarding the access 
level enforced in this session. 
The CONTINUE option allows the players to continue the negotiation-mediation proce- 
dure. 
At the QUIT option the OPERATOR can save the performed session. 
4 Example session 
After starting from the distributed disk using command line: MCBARG, the system will be 
loaded and you will see on the first screen full name of the program, names of the authors 
and institutions, version number and date of release (Figure 1). 
I MCPARG - Enhanced I 
I by L .  K rusr  P. B r o n i s z ,  P. Lopuch I 
I Enhanced v e r s i o n  September 1990 I 
i n Systems Research I n s t i t u t e ,  
Po l  i sh Academy o f  Sc i  ences. Warsaw, Pol  and 
I 
I 
f o r  System and D e c i s i o n  Sc iences  Program. 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  Appl l e d  Systems A n a l y s i s .  
Laxenburg.  A u s t r i a  ( C o p y r i g h t )  
P r e s s  any l:ey . . . 
Figure 1 
In this example session it is assumed that you play the role of an OPERATOR (the system 
analyst who prepares and conducts the session) and the roles of players participating in 
the mediation procedure. 
You start the work as the OPERATOR. Just press any key. The program will ask you to 
enter the OPERATOR password. If you do not use the password just press the <Enter> key. 
After that the first menu will be displayed (Figure 2). It is the M A I N  menu and appears 
in the left upper corner of the screen. 
On the top of the screen you can see the highlighted bar (head bar). In the bar, 
OPERATOR or Player names are displayed depending on who has access to the system at 
the current phase. 
At the bottom of the screen you can see another highlighted bar (help bar) with a 
brief explanation of all active keys at the moment. The help bars will appear during all 
phases of the work with the system. 
Notice that one of the commands (options) of menu is highlighted. This is the com- 
mand where the cursor is resting. You can activate this command by pressing the <Enter> 
key or you can move to another command using the arrow keys. You can also activate 
the requested command by pressing its first letter key. There is, however, one thing you 
should remember: you can not use the commands in any order. First you have to estab- 
lish the active model (the MODEL or OLD SESSION option) and then you can start playing 
with it. If it is not obvious what to do next, just press <F1> key (HELP) or select the 
INFORMATION option for more information. 
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Figure 2 
Let us continue our session. If the cursor remains on the MODEL option, just press the 
<Enter> key. The system will transfer control to the MODEL menu displayed in Figure 3. 
Once again, you are asked to select an option from the above menu. At first, select 
the LOAD option. (Other options will be inactive). Your screen will look like Figure 4. 
In the bottom window you will see names of the models created during the previous 
sessions. Choose the model named ACID.  
The ACID model relates to the problem of cooperation of two countries trying to 
decrease deposition of acid rains (in particular of sulfur). This will be our illustrative 
example to show how you can work within the MCBARG system. The story describing 
a bargaining problem is as follows: 
There are two countries disputing programs reducing sulfur emissions. Each country 
is assumed to have an adopted plan for emission control and expects the emission level E;. 
However it is also assumed that the deposition levels resulting from the L,, i = 1,2 are 
regarded as unacceptable, therefore an additional emission control program is requested 
and required for the program expenditures are discussed. 
For each country i = 1,2 there is a given cost function describing minimal required 
total cost C; of reducing the total emission from the level &, to the level E;. The function 
is assumed to be decreasing and piece-wise linear. 
The sulfur depositions in country i is described by the equation: 
where a;,, (i, j = 1,2) are parameters of the atmospheric transportation matrix (so called 
European Monitoring and Evaluation Programme matrix), Q; are depositions from emis- 
sion of the other countries. 
(The model was inspired by the paper by Bergman L., H. Cesar, G. Klaassen (1990)) 
however in our paper a different approach based on the interactive bargaining is proposed). 
The following two situations can be considered. 
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The first case deals with unilateral actions of the countries. In this case each country 
is assumed to enforce independently his additional program reducing sulfur emission. 
Paying Xi = c;, it achieves the emission E; and deposition D; calculated with use of the 
cost function and the deposition equation (where c, is cost of the program). 
In the second case cooperation of the countries is assumed, in a form of a bilateral 
agreement on a joint reducing program. In this case a joint fund is created, and the 
following equation is added to the model description: 
where Xi, i = 1,2  are shares of the countries in the joint fund, C;, i = 1,2  are costs of 
reducing the emissions in particular countries. In this case a multicriteria optimization 
problem can be considered in which the expenditures XI, X2 and the depositions Dl ,  D2 
are minimized subject to the constraints described by the cost functions, the deposition 
equations and the equation defining the joint fund with respect to the variables: the costs 
C1, C2 and the emissions El, E2. Solutions of the problem lay on a Pareto boundary of 
a simplex S in the four-dimensional objective space. Let S+ be defined by 
and called an agreement set. If S+ is not empty, it describes benefits the countries can 
achieve as an effect of cooperation in comparison to the first case. This is an incentive to 
cooperation. 
The bargaining problem consists of looking for an efficient solution in an agreement set, 
- - - - 
being subset of the simplex S, of all points dominating the point d = ( XI ,  XI2, Dl ,  D2) ,  
called further a status quo or a disagreement point. The solution should be selected 
according to the preferences of the countries considered further as players, and should 
assure the "fairness" rule. Roughly speaking, the problem consists in proper, agreeable 
to both the countries allocation of the benefits resulting from the cooperation. The 
MCBARG system supports analysis of the problem and selection of such a solution. 
In the ACID model each of the two players (countries) has two objectives, namely: 
the expenditures, and the sulfur deposition, to be minimized. Denoting the objectives by 
a l ,  a2 for the first player and by b l ,  b2 for the second one, respectively, the agreement set 
has been described by a set of linear inequalities presented in Figure 7. The description 
has been obtained for assumed forms of the cost functions and given parameters in depo- 
sition equations. The parameters have been assumed in such a way that the first player 
represents developing country with highly polluting technologies and very limited funds 
for the reducing program, while the second player represents highly developed country, 
with advanced technologies. 
To see how the model is introduced into the system, first select the EDIT option and 
next select in a sequence the options : PLAYERS, CRITERIA and FORMULAE exiting each 
of them by pressing <F9> key. You will obtain respectively the screens presented in 
Figures 5 , 6 and 7. 
In Figure 5 you can see the number of players (2) and their names (PLAYERI, PLAYER2). 
In Figure 6 the names of criteria, their description, status, units and status quo point 
are given. The criteria names are used in the description of the formulae defining the 
agreement set, as you can see in Figure 7. In the figure only part of the formualae is 
presented. To see all of the formulae use scrolling <Up, Down arrows > , <PgDn> and 
<PgUp> keys. 
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Leave the model unchanged and quit the EDIT option. 
Next, select the BUILD option of the MODEL menu. Wait please until the system has 
translated the model into the internal form and made the initial calculations. 
Next, return to  the MAIN menu and the start negotiation-mediation procedure by 
selection of the NEGOTIATION option. 
Before starting the mediation, the system will ask you to  specify the level of players' 
access to the information about the counterplayers. Press <F1> key (Help) to get detailed 
information about the possibilities provided by the system. Select the LEVEL 2 if you want 
players to receive all the available information in the system about the actions of their 
counterplayers. 
Now your screen will look like Figure 8. 
It allows the players to  take part in the negotiation procedure. From now on, you can 
play the role of one of the players or of the OPERATOR. 
The negotiation procedure is performed in a number of iterations. At each iteration 
the players make their decisions in a sequence, once per iteration. The OPERATOR can 
observe and review the players results, and save the finished or interrupted session. 
To continue the tutorial example select the PLAYERI. Type a password. The systems 
invokes the NEGOTIATION menu presented in Figure 9. 
Select the DECISION option. Within this option you can test the nature of the bargaining 
problem by generation of a number of anticipated solutions, obtained for different confi- 
dence coefficients and reference points specified in your objective space and in the space 
of the counterplayers. 
On the screen presented in Figure 10 you can see the DECISION menu in the top line 
and the first variant of anticipated solution in the table. 
It has been calculated for the reference point defined according to the direction from the 
status quo to the ideal point. The table contains, apart from the anticipated solution 
(Ant. sol.), the following values: number of variant (Var.), status quo, solution obtained 
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in the previous itertaion (Prev. sol.), reference point (Ref. point), RA-utopia point and 
ideal point. The status quo, the previous solution and the ideal point are constant within 
the analysis, while the other values depend on the confidence coefficient, on the reference 
point and on assumed actions of the counterplayer. The status quo and the previous 
solution are equal in the first round. The previous solution and the ideal point define 
reasonable bounds for the new reference points. 
Using the CONF-COEF option you can modify the confidence coefficient. The lower the 
value of the coefficient means you have a more limited confidence on the future outcomes of 
the problem. There will be a greater number of the iterations in the mediation procedure. 
In our example take the value 0.3. 
The NEWREF option allows you to specify reference points and to generate different 
variants of anticipated solutions, depending on your preferences. Notice that there is one 
variant already calculated and presented on the screen, so you start from the variant two. 
Let us assume that as the first player you prefer to obtain some reasonable decrease 
of both the expenditures and the sulfur depositions in comparison to the status quo. 
Select the NEW-REF option and type the reference for the cost and deposition (400.00 and 
1100.00 respectively). This will be variant 2. The system asks if you accept the default 
assumptions on the counterplayer decision. (By default the system assumes the decisions 
of the counterplayers on the base of the previous round, in the case of the first round 
on base of the direction generated by the ideal point). Press Y (yes) to proceed further. 
Wait until the system has finished the calculations and has presented the results. 
Test the next, third variant. Try to increase the cost and to decrease the deposition. 
Type the values 700.00 and 1000.00 respectively. Wait for results. The screen will look 
like Figure 1 1. 
You can compare the generated variants in a graphical form by pressing <Ctrl G> 
key. Try it. You see the horizontal bars representing the improvements of the anticipated 
solution in comparison to the status quo. In the case of the maximized criterion, the bar 
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begins at the left hand side of the screen, in the case of the minimized, at the right hand 
side. 
To analyze how the counterplayer decisions influence your outcomes, generate the 
variant 4 in the place of the variant 3, typing the same reference values as in the variant 2 
but answer N (no) to the system question about the assumptions on the counterplayer 
decision. You will have a posibility to choose and to type counterplayer reference values, 
different than the system default values. The anticipated solution will be computed using 
your values for the counterplayer. 
To look at the results of the simulated counterplayer actions, use the VIEW-CNTRSL 
option. An example of the displayed screen is presented in Figure 12. The results are 
presented in two tables. The table on the left relates to the counterplayer and the one on 
the right, to your results. You see one-shot solutions. These are solutions that lay on the 
Pareto frontier of the agreement set. 
Return to the DECISION menu pressing <F9> key. Now you should make your decision. 
Indicate the variant which represents your preferences and should be taken as the base 
in calculating the cooperative solution. Obviously, in a real decision analysis, you will 
generate a greater number of variants to be sure that the selected variant expresses your 
preferences. In this tutorial example select the second variant. To do this enter the 
SELECT option and using <Tab> key set the variant 2 to be the active variant (the active 
variant is highlighted). Press <Enter> key. 
In the bottom help lines you can see keys that were not used in the example. Here 
is their description. The <up, down arrows> scroll the active variants, <Ctrl PgUp, 
Ctrl PgDn> set the active criterion, and <PgUp, PgDn> scroll the criteria. The scrolling 
of the variants makes it possible to display on the screen any three of the generated 
variants. The scrolling of the criteria is useful when the number of criteria of the particular 
player is greater than 4. 
Quit the DECISION menu, and quit the NEGOTIATION menu. You will be back at the 
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screen presented in Figure 8. Select the PLAYER2. Next select the DECISION option in 
the NEGOTIATION menu. You will obtain the screen similar to the screen of the PLAYER1 
presented in Figure 9. Perform the interactive analysis in the same way as for the PLAYER1. 
Assume that the PLAYER2 has less limited confidence in the future outcomes than the 
PLAYER1. Describe his confidence with the coefficient equal to 0.4. 
Next, type the reference values for the objectives of this player. The PLAYER2, repre- 
senting highly developed country is interested mainly in a decreasing of the sulfur depo- 
sition. He decides to have the cost closely to the status quo level. Generate two variants 
for this player. Type the reference of the second variant on the level 2800.0, 1400.0 for the 
cost and the deposition respectively. This will be the variant 2. Next create the variant 3 
with the reference values 3000.0, 1200.0 respectively. In both cases accept the default 
values for the counterplayer decision. You will obtain the screen presented in Figure 13. 
Select the second variant as the preferable one. Quit the DECISION option and the 
NEGOTIATION menu. 
Wait until the system has calculated the cooperative solution of the iteration. Now 
you are ready to start the next iteration. You see the screen presented in Figure 8. 
Select PLAYER1 and press the <Enter> key. You will invoke the NEGOTIATION menu. 
Before making a decision for the second iteration you can look at the first iteration, results 
selecting the VIEW option. Try it. You will see the screen presented in Figure 14. 
Return to the NEGOTIATION menu and select the DECISION option. Follow the actions 
of PLAYER1 presented in Figure 15 and select the variant 3. Note that the confidence 
coefficient has been assumed on the level of 1.000. Next quit the DECISION option and 
NEGOTIATION menu. 
Select PLAYER2, next the DECISION menu and follow the actions of PLAYER2 presented 
in Figure 16. Select the variant 3 as the preferable variant, quit the DECISION and the 
NEGOTIATION menu. 
The system will calculate the final, efficient cooperative solution, ~roposed to the 
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players as a mediation solution. 
Try to play the role of OPERATOR to review the session results selecting VIEW option in 
the OPERATOR menu, or to print the results using PRINT option. 
HCBAHG MODEL: ACID SESSION: ACIDZY 9 1  7/1990-1Y,: (1) 
FLgYER: PLAYERl 
I------------------------------------------ I 
I C r i t e r i a  names I Cost I Deposi t .  I 
I U n i t s  I 1C)E6 DM I mgS/mZ/y I 
I Sta tus  I min I min I 
I------------------------------------------I 
I Sta tus  Ouo I ~(:)(:).I:)c) I Z45'.0.01:) I 
I I d e a l  P o i n t  I 1:) . (:)(I I 9?7,.48 I 
I------------------------------------------ I 
I Agreement p o i n t  I I I 
I a t  i t e r a t i o n :  1  1 609. 36 I 2028. 14 I 
I 2 I 5 7 5 . 3  I 1459.11 I 
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I------------------------------------------ I 
I C r i t e r i a  names I Cost I Deposi t .  I 
I U n i t s  I 1OEb DM I mgS/mZ/y I 
I S t a t u s  I min I min I 
I------------------------------------------ I 
I Sta tus  Ouo I ~o(:)I:).(:)o I 175(:).Or:l I 
I I d e a l  P o i n t  I 1626.51 I 1095.82 I 
I------------------------------------------ I 
I Agreement p o i n t  I I I 
I a t  i t e r a t i o n :  1  I 2911.84 I 1595.7Z I 
I 2 I 2 8 5 9 . 7 4 1  1 Z 6 4 . 7 8 1  
Session f i n i s h e d  Figure 17 
A summary printing of the session ACID2Y.SES is presented in Figure 17. Observe 
that at the final solution PLAYER1 has obtained a reasonable decrease, in comparison to 
the status quo, of both - the cost and the deposition levels, while PLAYER2 has obtained 
the cost and the deposition levels relevant to the assumed preferences - large decrease of 
the deposition level under costs close to the status quo. 
The results can be reviewed and printed by any of the players (VIEW and PRINT options 
of the NEGOTIATION menu. 
Quit the OPERATOR menu, not saving the session. The session of this tutorial example 
is already saved in the ACIDZY. SES file. 
Quit the MAIN menu to leave the system. 
5 Technical information 
The program is distributed on a diskette that should be installed on an IBM PC compat- 
ible computer. This diskette contains the following files: 
MCBARG . EXE - binary code of the program, 
INFOSYS . DAT - file of records containing information presented in the program by 
INFO option, 
HELPSYS . DAT - file of records containing information presented in the program by 
HELP option, 
A C I D  .MOD, AGRICO .MOD - files containing the illustrative examples of bargaining 
problems (description of AGRICO.MOD - see Bronisz, Krus, Lopuch, 1988), 
ACID2Y. SES - file containing the illustrative session. 
The program is activated by the command: MCBARG. It automatically recognizes one 
of the following graphic cards: HERCULES, CGA, EGA. 
The program enables a user to create new models (sessions) of bargaining problems and 
to save the models (sessions) on the active disk. Default extension of the files containing 
the models is .MOD (the session - .SES ). During a session with the system the following 
auxiliary files are generated on the disk: BACKUP .DDD, BACKUP. SSS. They are erased after 
a session. 
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